I. INTRODUCTION
Summary judgment, the acknowledged -workhorse‖ of federal pretrial practice, 1 is again under scrutiny. It certainly performs the yeoman-like task of sorting cases that deserve trial from those that do not and, hence, it can work to conserve scarce judicial and jury resources. 2 To the extent that it identifies claims that are factually unsupported, it serves an important, indeed, vital role in the pretrial process. Summary judgment has, however, become the subject of farreaching criticism, including assertions that judges too readily employ question seriously its implementation, summary judgment is contributing to the reinvention of other pretrial tools, most notably (but by no means only), the Rule 12(b) (6) 11 motion to dismiss. 12 Additionally, summary judgment has been the subject of recent rulemaking, both in the general restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in a separate rulemaking project to improve Rule 56. 13 Thus, the Section on Litigation of the Association of American Law Schools devoted its most recent Annual Meeting program to consideration of the future of summary judgment. This symposium issue provides perspectives on emerging implementation strategies and roles for summary judgment. The articles also reveal the tendency of changes in summary judgment law to emerge through interpretation, often of trial and appellate courts, rather than through intentional change of Rule 56 through the Rules Enabling Act process. Summary judgment has undergone multiple incarnations. Conceived in England and carried forward in early America as a tool that would primarily assist plaintiffs in terminating one-sided and undisputed cases before trial, 14 summary judgment was intended to reduce -delay and expense resulting from frivolous defenses‖ 15 and, thus, early served the efficiency and fairness premise of procedure. 16 The original Federal Rules saw the birth of an expanded summary judgment device in Rule 56 that would be available to both plaintiffs and defendants, 17 but would still serve to prevent the delay, expense, and inconvenience of proceeding through trial when one party proposed -sham claims or defenses.‖ 18 Over the years, summary judgment received mixed reaction in the federal courts, with some judges using it aggressively and others approaching the grant of summary judgment based on a preview of the record with much more caution. 19 The 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6 Supreme Court, ultimately, through its 1986 trilogy, 20 elevated summary judgment from a -disfavored procedural shortcut‖ 21 to a position of pretrial prominence. Indeed, summary judgment has been identified as the central element in federal pretrial practice: -Summary judgment lurks over pleading, Rule 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss, rule 11, discovery, and mediation or dispute resolution if a case is diverted to a ‗neutral third party,' for the question is always what will happen on summary judgment. It impacts and intertwines with every aspect of litigation. . . . The threat of summary judgment shapes settlement even in advance of a motion being filed. . . .‖ 22 And defendants, of course, have come to use the summary judgment tool much more frequently than plaintiffs. 23 Through this odyssey, summary judgment has evolved from a predominantly plaintiff's side tool to be used in limited instances of clearly one-sided and undisputed cases to a pretrial weapon deployed most often by defendants and too often, in the view of some, to deprive a party of a right to trial when issues of fact may remain. 24 In some respects, then, summary judgment has come to appear not so much as a workhorse employed in the task of efficient pretrial sorting, but as something of a Trojan horse that has been brought into the federal pretrial encampment and that is used to isolate factually insufficient claims, but that can be and is sometimes also deployed to deny trial on potentially meritorious claims, based on an early preview of the evidence. 21. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 327. This oft-quoted characterization of pre-trilogy treatment of summary judgment approaches hyperbole, as Professor Burbank points out that the available empirical data does not show a sharp increase in use of summary judgment following the Supreme Court's 1986 trio of decisions. Instead, Professor Burbank notes that the increased role of summary judgment began in the 1970s. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 620-21; see also Stempel, supra note 8, at 159-60.
22. Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 539-40; see also Bronsteen, supra note 8, at 523-24 (recognizing summary judgment as a -pillar of our system,‖ along with trial and settlement); Miller, supra note 3, at 1016 (noting that summary judgment has -moved to the center of the litigation stage‖). Professor Schneider perceives, however, that summary judgment may lose its central role to the revitalized Rule 12(b) (6) 23. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1190; Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 103 (noting that defendants bring three-fourths of all motions for summary judgment and that defendants' motions are granted more often than plaintiffs' motions).
24. See, e.g., Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 542-44; Miller, supra note 3, at 1065-69; Wald, supra note 3, at 1898; McGinley, supra note 3, at 229; Stempel, supra note 8, at 159.
In this review of the evolving role of summary judgment, Professor Steven Gensler provides insight into whether Rule 56(c) give judges discretion to deny summary judgment even if the preconditions of Rule 56(c) have been met, i.e., if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment as a matter of law could be entered, 25 and Professor Edward Brunet engages directly the important debate regarding intemperate use of summary judgment to deny potentially meritorious claims, contending that currently available -safeguards‖ can prevent inappropriate grant of summary judgment.
26 Professor Stephen Burbank and Professor Linda Mullenix enlarge the discussion to consider as well the impact of summary judgment on other aspects of the interconnected federal procedural system. Professor Burbank explores the increasing doctrinal linking of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and summary judgment and the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly 27 and Iqbal 28 on the future of rulemaking. 29 Professor Mullenix evaluates the desirability of increasing the tasks assigned to the sturdy summary judgment workhorse, at least in the area of complex litigation, by including in the Federal Rules explicit authorization for courts to consider summary judgment on the named plaintiffs' claims before class certification. 30 Finally, Professor Jeffrey Cooper reviews diverging Supreme Court opinions to provide insight on whether, under the Erie doctrine, Federal Rule 56 will continue to control in diversity cases.
31
Pervading these discussions is the appropriate balance of use of summary judgment to further the efficiency canon of procedure and of the corresponding need to temper its use to ensure access and accuracy, or what Professor Spencer would refer to as the ongoing dialectic between the currently ascendant -restrictive ethos‖ in federal procedure and federal procedure's core liberal ethos, which would privilege court access and accuracy over efficiency.
32
A dominant subtext of the articles is the interplay between summary judgment and federal 25 rulemaking, including the impact on summary judgment of federal rulemaking, the effect of the transsubstantive assumption of the Rules Enabling Act, and the limits of the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act. IN PRACTICE: IDENTIFYING THE STATUS QUO  AND ASSESSING STRATEGIES TO PREVENT IMPROVIDENT GRANT OF  SUMMARY JUDGMENT Articles by Professor Steven Gensler and Professor Edward Brunet address, respectively, recent rulemaking regarding summary judgment and the criticism that current implementation of summary judgment can lead to denial of the right to trial on meritorious claims. 33 Professor Gensler explores the effect of recent rulemaking amendments on the debate regarding whether Rule 56 permits a measure of judicial discretion to deny summary judgment even when the record reveals, on undisputed facts, that judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. 34 He concludes that although pending amendments to Rule 56 will eliminate express textual reference to the issue, those amendments do not eliminate judicial discretion to deny summary judgment, but, instead, maintain the level of discretion that was available before the restyling change to Rule 56.
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Professor Brunet's article acknowledges the criticism that current implementation of summary judgment can result in dismissal of meritorious cases, but concludes that the efficiency gains associated with appropriate use of summary judgment justify attempts to remedy defects in current practice. 36 He assesses available techniques to 33. Gensler, supra note 25; Brunet, supra note 2. 34. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 104-09 (illustrating that, as a practical matter, judges do deny summary judgment in some cases in which the Rule 56 standard for summary judgment has been met).
35. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1142, 1160-62 & n.16. Professor Gensler concentrates, in Must, Should, Shall, on the impact, if any, of rulemaking changes to Rule 56 on judicial discretion to deny summary judgment when summary judgment is otherwise applicable. He concludes that two recent sets of rulemaking changes to the language of Rule 56 do not alter the judge's discretion. He also concludes that, as a normative matter, judges should have discretion to deny summary judgment in at least some categories of cases, but he reserves his detailed discussion of those categories for a sequel to this article. 39 He focuses on the short-lived textual change from language providing that summary judgment -shall be rendered‖ if the record reveals -no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,‖ to language stating that summary judgment -should‖ be rendered if those conditions pertain, and back, again, to -shall.‖ 40 The 2007 change to include -should‖ originated in the Style Project, 41 in which the inherently ambiguous -shall‖ was to be excised from all restyled Rules and replaced with -must,‖ -may,‖ or other appropriate and unambiguous language. 42 The drafters of restyled Rule 56 settled on the use of -should‖ as a replacement for -shall‖ in Rule 56 with the expectation that -should‖ would continue the then-existing level of judicial discretion to deny summary judgment when the required Rule 56 showing had been made. 43 As part of a subsequent, separate rulemaking project to improve Rule 56, Professor Gensler notes, the Advisory Committee solicited comment on the restyling change from -shall‖ to -should. Faced with substantial disagreement and lack of briefing procedures (ultimately referred to as the -point-counterpoint‖ amendment) that would require the moving party to file a statement of material facts that are not in dispute, the nonmoving party to respond to the statement of purportedly uncontested facts, and the movant to file a final submission; (2) to address explicitly in the Rule common practices nationwide that were not codified, such as the practice to permit partial summary judgment; and (3) to continue to permit the standard for summary judgment to be governed by judicial decision. Id. at 1153. Perhaps the most controversial of these amendments was the so-called -point-counterpoint‖ proposal, which would have included in Rule 56 detailed requirements for parties to assert, support, and contest the statements of fact offered in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion, and which the Advisory Committee ultimately abandoned. consensus on either -must‖ or -should,‖ the Advisory Committee resolved the disagreement by return to the original -shall,‖ concluding that the phrase -shall be entered‖ as used in Rule 56 had, through usage and interpretation, acquired a special meaning that could not be safely altered. 47 Professor Gensler emphasizes that both the restyling change to -should‖ and the pending restoration of -shall‖ in Rule 56(c) were intended to maintain, rather than alter, the level of judicial discretion to deny summary judgment. 48 Thus, after the Rule 56 language is returned to the original -shall be entered‖ on December 1, 2010, judges will have the same level of discretion as before the restyling of Rule 56. 49 The trickier task is to define the pre-restyling level of judicial discretion, since neither the text of Rule 56 nor Supreme Court case law provides a definitive answer.
Commentators Friedenthal and Gardner have previously established that many courts, in fact, exercise discretion to deny summary judgment even when the requirements of Rule 56 have been met. 50 They have also argued that trial courts should have this discretion in some cases.
51 Professor Gensler will also conclude, in a sequel to Must, Should, Shall, that trial courts should have a limited discretion to deny summary judgment. 52 That limited discretion to deny summary judgment when its grant would otherwise be appropriate would respond to some current criticisms of summary judgment: it would maintain and perhaps enhance the efficiency rationale of 51. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 95, 125-30. Friedenthal and Gardner suggest a balancing test that would balance the interest of the plaintiff and defendant and the efficiency concerns of the court. Id. They advocate that a judge should consider factors, including whether the claim involves motive, state of mind, or credibility; the complexity of the issue; and whether issues ripe for summary judgment are intertwined with issues for which summary judgment is not appropriate, i.e., whether any summary judgment granted could ultimately be partial only. The judge would have authority to deny summary judgment when the -matter is better suited to adjudication by trial rather than through summary judgment procedures.‖ Id.
52. Gensler, supra note 35. AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1107 summary judgment 53 by permitting a judge to screen most claims for early dismissal whose outcome is fixed as a matter of law, but it would also provide a safety valve of judicial discretion to deny summary judgment when the benefits of reserving judgment until presentation of the merits at trial outweigh the cost and delay of waiting until trial. 54 Moreover, inclusion of a limited discretion to deny summary judgment in the text of Rule 56 would provide needed guidance to the courts. 55 The resolution of the -must, should‖ dispute by failing to decide the issue and by returning to the pre-restyling -shall,‖ however, presents in microcosm the rulemakers' increasing tendency to abandon proposed procedural Rule change if amendment cannot be accomplished by consensus. 56 In the Rule 56 project alone, Professor Gensler notes that rulemakers declined to consider including the standard for summary judgment in the Rule (in part because the rulemakers concluded that such an attempt would likely draw fire); 57 abandoned the controversial -point-counterpoint‖ proposal for lack of consensus; 58 and proposed return to the -shall be entered‖ language to obviate the need to resolve 53. Providing discretion to deny summary judgment may, in some cases, result in greater efficiency, and Friedenthal and Gardner propose that Rule 56 explicitly provide to judges the discretion to deny summary judgment when it would -be cost-efficient for both the parties and the court. 57. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1151-52 (discussing as well the 1992 abandonment, for lack of consensus, of attempts to revise Rule 56 to include, among other items, a restatement of the standard for summary judgment).
58. Id. at 1160; Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 556-62.
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the -must, should‖ disagreement. 59 Professor Bone has illustrated that the rulemakers seek consensus among competing interest groups, and, failing that, adopt general procedural Rules with vague standards that leave the -hard questions‖ to judges in the context of specific cases.
60
Other commentators have, likewise, noted that procedural change under the Rules Enabling Act has come virtually to require consensus. 61 In fact, Professor Mullenix, in her contribution to this symposium, proposes amending the Federal Rules explicitly to authorize summary judgment before certification of a class action, and she hastens to add that, at this point, Rule revision to authorize pre-certification summary judgment motions would -consist of little more than codification of existing practice.‖ 62 Rulemakers also, as in the -must, should‖ context, choose to make no decision at all, which similarly privileges trial court discretion, and, in so doing, encourages procedural disuniformity.
63
In short, the Rules Enabling Act process has come to work best when it codifies existing practice, 64 as it continues to authorize judges to make normative decisions, in the context of particular cases, about whether they have discretion to deny summary judgment when it is otherwise technically available, and, if so, when to exercise such discretion. Additionally, the failure continues a trend of remitting procedural Rule change to ad hoc trial court decisionmaking in the context of individual cases, which presents the following downsides: the common law process is less democratic than the congressionally created Rules Enabling Act process; trial judges have less ability, in the context of specific cases, to gather the information regarding the competing views that is required to make optimal normative choices; and the general Rules adopted by the Advisory Committee will be transsubstantive in language only, but will result in varying application, at the discretion of trial judges. 68 Of equal importance, Rule-based guidance regarding the circumstances under which trial courts may appropriately consider discretionary denial of summary judgment would provide guidance to appellate courts and enable appellate courts more effectively to review the discretionary district court decision, which would enhance the predictability and uniformity of summary judgment. Enabling Act process may ultimately mean (absent the infrequent Rule change by congressional legislation or implementation of a means for cooperative Court-congressional rulemaking in a particular instance) that controversial procedural Rule change may be accomplished only by the Supreme Court acting in its adjudicatory capacity. Burbank, Dilemmas of "General Rules," supra at 562. Rule change accomplished by Court interpretation, however, is inferior to Rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act process and for many of the same reasons that ad hoc trial court decision making is inferior: the Court, acting in its adjudicatory capacity, has less institutional ability to obtain sufficient information; less institutional authority to make prospective policy decisions; and no institutional capacity to make substantive decisions. See, e.g., Burbank, Dilemmas of "General Rules," supra at 537, 561; Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra at 1473-75; Burbank, supra note 55, at 715-16; Bone, supra at 918.
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A Rule-based conclusion that judges have discretion to deny summary judgment in some instances when summary judgment is technically warranted or that they have no such discretion -that is, Advisory Committee resolution of the -must, should‖ disagreementwould have led to greater uniformity in application of Rule 56 and much needed guidance to federal trial and appellate judges. As Professor Gensler concludes, however, for now, the complex questions regarding whether Rule 56 confers discretion to deny summary judgment, and, if so, how much and in what circumstances, await further trial, appellate, and, perhaps, ultimately, Supreme Court consideration. 69 In assessing currently available techniques to harness summary judgment, Professor Brunet concludes, in a similar vein, that inclusion of such techniques in the text of Rule 56 is essential to consistency of application and, thus, effectiveness.
In Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 70 Professor Brunet critiques six potential -safeguards‖ that may prevent inappropriate grants of summary judgment: (1) judicial discretion to deny summary judgment based on a single issue of disputed fact; (2) the Rule 56(f) -time out‖ procedure that permits additional discovery before proceeding to summary judgment; (3) the requirement of de novo appellate review; (4) the requirement to weigh inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; (5) the potential ability of a nonmovant to provide contradictory evidence in inadmissible form; and (6) case law -cautions‖ against inappropriate use of summary judgment in particular categories of cases, including antitrust, negligence, and civil rights cases.
Professor Brunet reminds that summary judgment, though under attack, advances important policies, including screening meritless cases; conserving expensive and scarce trial and jury resources; promoting and encouraging settlement; and promoting efficiency.
71
Conceding that summary judgment may be misused, he nevertheless finds reason for optimism in summary judgment practice, emphasizing that existing protections can deter improper grants of summary judgment and facilitate its even-handed application.
72 He would rank the identified safeguards on a scale of effectiveness, ranging from significant impact in deterring inappropriate grants of summary judgment to relative ineffectiveness in deterring misuse. He ranks, as significant deterrents of inappropriate grants of summary judgment, two protections that find 69 Moreover, they argue that, given the current judicial receptivity to granting summary judgment, it is important that judges have discretion to deny summary judgment in some cases when it would otherwise be technically available, 81 and they have proposed amending Rule 56 to reflect this discretion. 82 They also conclude that a limited discretionary authority to deny summary judgment could serve both to prevent inappropriate grant of summary judgment and to enhance the efficiency of summary judgment. 83 Given Professor Brunet's conclusion that Rulebased summary judgment safeguards are the most effective in preventing inappropriate denials of summary judgment, the Advisory Committee's failure to resolve the -must, should‖/judicial discretion debate looms as an opportunity lost.
Professor Brunet would rank the availability of de novo review next in terms of effectiveness and of -moderate‖ effect in deterring inappropriate grants of summary judgment and would rank other, nonRule-based protections as of little effect. He concludes that certainty of a nondeferential, second evaluation on appeal deters inappropriate grants of summary judgment.
84
The deterrent effect of de novo review, however, is critical because, Professor Brunet observes, the effectiveness of de novo review as a safeguard is lessened by the expense of appellate review and the general impediments to reversing judgments on appeal.
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On the other hand, other protections not based in the text of Rule 56 -the common law requirement to weigh inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; 86 Both Professor Gensler and Professor Brunet reinforce the close relationship between the text of Rule 56 and summary judgment practice. Amendments to Rule 56 and decisions not to amend the Rule will affect both summary judgment practice and uniformity of that practice. Additionally, there is ample literature establishing that decisionmaking by the Advisory Committee is superior in many instances to permitting ad hoc trial court discretion 90 and noting that, as an institutional matter, delegating normative decisionmaking to trial 89. Id. at 1171-77, 1188. Brunet notes that court-created -cautions‖ against unbridled use of summary judgment in particular categories of cases, including antitrust cases, negligence cases, and civil rights cases, provide little more than slogans or exhortations that some courts will follow but others will ignore, in part, because these substance-specific -cautions‖ against inappropriate use lack textual support in Rule 56. Moreover, Professor Brunet points out that courts increasingly emphasize that substance-specific cautions contradict the transsubstantive assumption of the Federal Rules that procedural rules should apply uniformly across all subjects and regardless of case size. . Some of these case-specific -cautions,‖ however, such as the -handle with care‖ attitude of some, but by no means all, courts regarding civil rights and employment discrimination cases, actually reduce to concern with issues that may occur across all categories of cases (and, thus, do not implicate the transsubstantive assumption of the Federal Rules). For example, case law cautions against use of summary judgment in civil rights and employment cases often focus on the appropriateness of resolution at summary judgment of issues of motive and/or credibility. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1175-77 (citing Allen v. Chicago Transit Auth., 317 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)). With this type of focus, the primary obstacle to effectiveness will be whether the issue arises to one that, as a normative matter, should prevent summary judgment, rather than the transsubstantive assumption of federal rulemaking. Indeed, the issues of motive and/or intent in summary judgment are issues that Friedenthal and Gardner would include in amendments to Rule 56 regarding discretion to deny summary judgment when technically applicable. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 126-28. In other instances, however, such as cases espousing a -handle with care‖ philosophy regarding antitrust issues, the transsubstantive premise of the federal rulemaking may be in play. But see Wald, supra note 3, at 1904 (stating that the -presumptively off-limits areas [for grant of summary judgment] included antitrust, patents, negligence, civil rights, and broadly conceived categories labeled ‗important public issues ' 94 and may also result in a cooperative Court-Congress rulemaking process for circumstances in which substance-specific Rules are required.
95
Professor Mullenix explores another new role for summary judgment. She advocates amending the Federal Rules to authorize explicitly the use of summary judgment before class certification in class action cases. Professor Mullenix, moreover, suggests that the time has come to abandon the notion that summary judgment is inappropriate in complex cases. Given the substantial costs in litigant and judicial resources exacted by complex litigation, Professor Mullenix concludes that the presumption ought, in some cases, to be reversed: complex litigation is, instead, particularly suitable for adjudication by summary judgment.
In In the comparative portion of the piece, Professor Burbank draws parallels in the evolution of summary judgment and pleading practice and exposes critical differences in these pretrial devices that, until recently, had warranted different analytical treatment. Over its seventy-year history, summary judgment transformed from a device its drafters thought would be used principally by plaintiffs to parry sham defenses in debt collection cases to a device used primarily by defendants and used in the broad run of cases. 100 Professor Burbank emphasizes that, throughout this transformation, the summary judgment tool remained faithful to its original purpose of screening from trial factually insufficient claims and preventing unnecessary cost and delay.
101 By contrast, in two short years, Professor Burbank observes, the Supreme Court, through its opinions in Twombly and Iqbal, conflated Rule 12(b) (6) Iqbal has already, with its invocation of -judicial experience and common sense,‖ introduced in the Rule 12(b)(6) context and before time for discovery, mechanical techniques of -inference carving‖ similar to the factual and legal carving of summary judgment that creates less in the parts than in the sum of the 99. Burbank parts and that threatens both the right to trial and underlying substantive rights. 107 And just as discovery is necessary before summary judgment, commentators are finding the solution to the Twombly/Iqbal invitation to -inference carving‖ based on -judicial experience and common sense‖ to be permitting discovery, here, limited or targeted discovery. 108 Turning from the likely litigation impacts of Twombly and Iqbal, Professor Burbank probes the potential depth of their rulemaking effects, suggesting that Twombly and Iqbal may impact federal rulemaking as deeply as the developing empirical research is likely to reveal their litigation impacts to be broad. First, Professor Burbank emphasizes the Court's disregard, in Twombly and Iqbal, of the Rules Enabling Act process for amending Federal Rules, a process the Court has consistently recognized as the sole procedure for Rule amendment. 109 Second, Professor Burbank emphasizes the distinct possibility of congressional action to overturn the move to plausibility pleading. 110 Third, he suggests that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the lower courts' application of those decisions, and the developing empirical data may highlight sufficiently the costs of transsubstantive general rules to lead to a partial restructuring of the Rules Enabling Act process. 111 Thus, Professor Burbank posits that, the ultimate rulemaking upshot of Twombly and Iqbal may be dramatic -legislative creation of a new procedural rulemaking process that permits federal rulemakers to propose substance-specific rules that will become effective only if enacted by Congress.
112
In his essay, Professor Burbank reminds that Twombly and Iqbal may not simply be ill-advised from a policy standpoint. 113 Instead, rulemaking process matters. The Court's choice of Rule amendment by adjudication underscores the defects of a rulemaking process that has been construed to require transsubstantive, 114 general rules for all situations, including those in which the problem at issue calls for a targeted and/or substance-specific solution, 115 and particularly when that process has also come to require consensus. 116 When the rulemaking process is viewed by the Court as ineffective for some categories of Rules and seeking congressional assistance is viewed as undesirable, the remaining option is Rule amendment by Court interpretation.
117 Court rulemaking by adjudication, however, is a poor substitute for the Rules Enabling Act process because the Court must act within the bounds of interpretation in a particular case; Court access to information in the context of a particular case cannot replicate the broad-based information that can be obtained through the Rules Enabling Act process or by 112. Burbank Congress; 118 and Court adjudication, which is less democratic and less participatory, is peculiarly inappropriate for resolving important issues of social policy. 119 Simply put, the Court, in its adjudicative role lacks institutional capacity that it has when it acts through the Rules Enabling Act process, and it lacks the institutional authority to make broad decisions regarding social policy or, of course, substantive rights. 120 Moreover, because of the assumption that the Rules Enabling Act requires transsubstantive rules that apply to all cases, regardless of size or subject matter, 121 Professor Burbank has previously observed that, Court Rules, whether created through the Rules Enabling Act process or through Court adjudication, are often crafted to deal with the fairness and efficiency calculus of the complex case and then applied to smaller cases, which may price smaller cases out of federal court. 122 Increasingly, however, the demand is for process that addresses separately the needs of complex and noncomplex cases. 123 Indeed, Professor Mullenix takes aim directly at the complex case, proposing a Rule amendment that would affect complex litigation only. In Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced Summary Judgment Prior to Class Certification, 124 Professor Mullenix proposes amending the Federal Rules to authorize or require use of summary judgment before certification in class action cases and in other aggregate litigation.
125 She recommends either a -weak-form‖ version of Rule amendment that would specifically authorize judges to consider summary judgment before class certification or a -strong-form‖ version that would require consideration of summary judgment before class certification. 126 Professor Mullenix emphasizes that, at this point, Rule amendment to authorize summary judgment before class certification would amount to codification of the status quo, 127 as courts and commentators have concluded that pre-certification summary judgment is not only permissible, 128 but preferable in some cases.
129
Nevertheless, Professor Mullenix recommends Rule amendment to articulate explicitly judicial authority to grant pre-certification summary judgment because it would provide judges with Rule-based, textual authority upon which to proceed. 130 Here, Professor Mullenix echoes Professor Brunet's observation, in Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, that inclusion of guidance in the Federal Rules results in greater effectiveness, consistency, and uniformity. 131 Inclusion of authority for pre-certification summary judgment in the Federal Rules would dispel notions of some judges that pre-certification summary judgment may not, or ought not, as a discretionary matter, be granted in class litigation; that the so-called -Eisen rule‖ 132 precludes pre-certification summary judgment; 133 or that complexity in itself should preclude use of summary judgment.
134
Rule revision, thus, would signal that consideration of summary judgment before class certification is not simply appropriate, it may be preferable. 135 In the bulk of the article, Professor Mullenix makes a compelling case for authorizing or requiring summary judgment on the named plaintiffs' claims before addressing class certification issues. Precertification summary judgment, Professor Mullenix emphasizes, would serve efficiency and fairness by avoiding the high transaction costs associated with class actions, including the increasingly burdensome 127. Id. at 1242. 128. Id. at 1202-03, 1207-11 & n.53 (emphasizing that the Federal Judicial Center's Managing Class Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges now instructs that federal judges may rule on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment before class certification and, in fact, encourages precertification ruling on dispositive motions as the -most efficient practice‖ and emphasizing as well that many courts in fact do rule on dispositive motions before class certification).
129. 178 (1974) , is not implicated by the proposal for pre-certification summary judgment. As Professor Mullenix explains, the Eisen rule is applicable when a judge evaluates whether to certify a class. The proposal for pre-certification summary judgment, by contrast, is for summary judgment before the class certification process. Thus, the Eisen rule is not at issue. Id. at 1201, 1242. Although some courts have previously applied the Eisen rule to precertification dispositive motions, Professor Mullenix illustrates that courts have moved away from this interpretation, id. at 1212-15, and that commentators have also concluded that Eisen does not present a barrier to consideration of merits issues at the class certification stage. costs of class certification under the heightened standards now imposed by appellate courts; it would ameliorate the settlement pressure associated with class action litigation; and it would narrow the debate over the extent and nature of permissible pre-certification merits discovery since discovery regarding the merits would be available in pre-certification summary judgment.
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Indeed, it would avoid class certification costs entirely if the defendant prevails on the precertification motion for summary judgment (and no other plaintiff stepped forward to -pick up the spear dropped by the named plaintiff‖ 137 ), and, conversely, it would render the incurring of certification costs meaningful if the plaintiff prevails at summary judgment.
138 It would, in other words, put the horse firmly before the cart.
Professor Mullenix underscores, as well, that this form of precertification merits review is consonant with the efficiency and fairness rationale underlying other recent trends in federal litigation, including (1) the new plausibility pleading requirements introduced by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal; 139 and (2) the move to significantly more rigorous class certification requirements in many circuits (which in some jurisdictions, newly requires courts to make -findings‖ by a preponderance that all Rule 23 requirements have been met, to resolve all factual and legal issues even if they overlap with the merits, and to resolve conflicting expert testimony).
140
Professor Mullenix emphasizes also the growing academic acceptance of merits review in the class action context, and she joins the conversation with a powerful suggestion for pre-certification merits review in the form of pre-certification summary judgment. There ought, many have concluded, to be an early and meaningful review of the merits during class certification or, at least, before settlement of a class action. regarding early review of the merits to a point before the class certification stage of the litigation and, thus, provides advantages unavailable at later stages: It serves the efficiency and fairness functions of traditional summary judgment, but it does so at a time before the parties incur the tremendous costs now associated with the heightened rigor of class certification and with settlement pressure following certification. It avoids the debate in each case regarding the amount of merits discovery to permit during class certification by making the merits the main event and permitting discovery sufficient to resolve the summary judgment motion. It also coincides with the efficiency and fairness concerns underlying the Supreme Court's pleading decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. Further, this early form of merits review would end the case, if at all, only on the individual named plaintiffs' claims, thus permitting others with viable claims to carry on the litigation as individual plaintiffs or as named plaintiffs.
Of equal significance, Profess Mullenix's suggested Rule revision proposes a timing change regarding summary judgment that is targeted specifically to address the issue of the meritless class action. It would use summary judgment -early summary judgment, to be sure, but at least a process that permits discovery before case termination -to serve its traditional gatekeeping role. It would recognize judges as capable of managing discovery relevant to the pre-certification summary judgment process, and it would recognize summary judgment both as capable of performing its traditional gatekeeping function and as sufficient to prevent the tremendous settlement pressure associated with class actions. Thus, Professor Mullenix's proposed codification in the Federal Rules of the currently available pre-certification summary judgment has much to commend it. So, what of the future of the federal standard for summary judgment in diversity actions, after Shady Grove? Professor Cooper concludes that the possibility of state summary judgment procedure governing in diversity actions was always slight and, following Shady Grove, it is even slimmer. 168 Those justices agreeing with Justice Scalia's plurality opinion would most likely conclude that the summary judgment standard is -procedural‖ and, hence, valid and to be uniformly applied in federal diversity actions -it is part of the means of enforcing the substantive rights, not a rewriting or alteration of substantive rights or remedies.
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169 Justice Stevens's view on the uniform application of federal summary judgment procedure is not so clear. He does admit the possibility of state procedural law so bound up with substantive rights and remedies that it forms part of the substantive state law and would overcome a conflicting Federal Rule, 170 but he also emphasizes that state procedural rules that are sufficiently intertwined with substantive law that they must be considered part of the state's substantive law for Erie purposes will be rare. Thus, Professor Cooper concludes that, although uniform application of Rule 56 in diversity actions is much more likely given the combined plurality and concurring opinions in Shady Grove, the final answer remains uncertain.
171
The uncertainty, however, does not end with summary judgment. As Professor Cooper has highlighted, at stake is the continued uniform application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity actions. 172 The Court is reconsidering the application of its framework for conflicting Federal Rules and state law under Erie, and among the potential candidates are the analysis set forth in Semtek and those in the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove. In each of these analyses, the justices seem to agree on the general framework established in Hanna v. Plumer 173 Professor Cooper illustrates that Semtek seems to define whether a Rule violates the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act (the requirement that a Rule not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right) by reference to the twin concerns of Erie -whether the Rule would encourage forum shopping or inequitable administration of the laws. 176 This construction of Semtek, of course, would maintain the current framework in name only and would dramatically transform the analysis of conflicting Federal Rules and state law. It would provide an easily administered test (the -twin aims‖ concerns of whether a Federal Rule leads to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the laws), it would align the Rules Enabling Act and Rules of Decision Act analyses, 177 and it would accord respect to state law, but it would also permit Federal Rules to be overcome by state procedural law more frequently. As noted, at least five justices have taken steps in Shady Grove to distance themselves from any such analysis. 178 Each of the Shady Grove formulations hews more closely to the traditional Federal Rules analysis under Hanna v. Plumer, 179 but would vary in the resulting uniformity of the Federal Rules, ease of judicial administration, and recognition of important state interests. Justice Scalia's approach for the Shady Grove plurality, would characterize a conflicting Federal Rule as either -procedural‖ or -substantive,‖ for purposes of whether it violates the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act, with little or no reference to the state law at issue. It would promote both uniformity of the Federal Rules and ease of judicial administration, 180 but it would seem to return the federal courts to a previous position of failing to take substantive rights under the Rules Enabling Act seriously. 181 Justice Stevens, in concurrence in Shady Grove, agrees that Congress intended to create a uniform system of Federal Rules, but contends that Congress itself, through the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act, requires that Federal Rules defer to state procedural law when the state law is sufficiently bound up with state-created rights and remedies. 182 Thus, under Justice Stevens's approach, a court must examine the content and purpose of state law to determine if the Federal Rule impermissibly impacts state substantive law, but Justice Stevens stresses that such instances will be rare. Justice Stevens emphasizes also that both -respect for state construction of its own rights and remedies‖ and separation of powers concerns require this approach. 183 This approach would purchase uniformity of Federal Rules in general (Federal Rules would -rarely‖ be found to impermissibly impact substantive rights 184 ) and respect for state substantive law, but at what Justice Scalia deems to be too high a price in difficulty of judicial administration. 185 Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, suggests that greater attention should be paid to the initial question of whether the Federal Rule and state law are even in conflict and that the Court should continue its previous trend of construing Federal Rules to -avoid conflict with state laws‖ when significant state policies would be implicated and no countervailing federal interest is at stake. 186 Justice Ginsburg's approach would privilege the state's interest, putting less emphasis on uniform application of Federal Rules in diversity and less emphasis on avoiding difficult interpretation of state law.
Shady Grove reveals that the application of the Erie framework for conflicting Federal Rules and state law under the Hanna v. Plumer framework is at a crossroads. Five justices have backed away from the suggestion in Semtek that the Court might import the twin aims of Erie concerns for forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws into the Federal Rules analysis. In the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove, the Court debates both whether Federal Rules should be read narrowly to avoid conflicts with state law when possible (thus, implicating the Rules of Decision Act analysis) and whether, in determining if a Federal Rule violates the substantive rights prohibition, the Court will consider the content and/or purpose of conflicting state law. The Court reaches no definite conclusion on either issue, leaving the resolution of these important questions, for later cases. In short, there is much illumination in Shady Grove, but how the Court will ultimately apply its agreed-upon framework for resolving potential conflicts between Federal Rules and state law remains in the shadows.
V. CONCLUSION
The contributors to this symposium on the Future of Summary Judgment provide insight into (1) interpretation of the amendments to Federal Rule 56 that are set to take effect on December 1, 2010; (2) emerging safeguards to prevent improvident grant of summary judgment; (3) the potential of summary judgment to impact interrelated aspects of the pretrial process, including the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and class action litigation; and (4) the future of the federal standard for summary judgment in diversity cases. Prominent in the articles is the authors' recognition of the important influence of federal rulemaking and the Rules Enabling Act on the future of summary judgment. The authors invite us to wrestle not only with the critical issues of the fairness and efficiency of summary judgment, but also with often buried issues of rulemaking, rulemaking process, and institutional capacity. They remind of the important practical impact -in terms of increased uniformity, predictability, and superior policymaking -of including specific guidance for trial judges in the text of the Federal Rules. They explore the meaning of the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act, and they insist that we consider rulemaking process and institutional capacity in federal rulemaking.
